Ghana Elections -Justin Beiber and election fever…

#Egypt was the most popular Twitter hashtag in 2011, edging out other less revolutionary contenders like #JustinBeiber. 'The power of we' is the theme of today's Blog Action Day, and although 'beliebers' might not necessarily agree, there could hardly be a more powerful example of the power of we than the thousands of people brought together (often through social media) across the Middle East and North Africa to hold their governments to account and demand democratic change. My last post looked at Ghana's strong democratic tradition, and in this one I'm going to look at how DFID is supporting social media and technology as positive forces in the upcoming December elections in Ghana.

After violence broke out following the 2007 Kenyan election, a group of Kenyan bloggers and activists rapidly put together a website, Ushahidi (meaning testimony in Swahili), which would allow Kenyans to submit reports on violent incidents breaking out across the country. Collating information that was submitted on mobile phones and through the internet, crowdsourcing and mapping it out across the country. Ushahidi could create a more up-to-date and accurate picture of what was happening on the ground than the media or security services could manage.

Since then the technology has been used across the world from elections in Nigeria to the tsunami in Japan, and through STAR Ghana UK aid is supporting Ghana Votes a website which will use the Ushahidi platform to monitor Ghana's election in December.

In a country of 25 million people but only 250,000 telephone lines and 50,000 fixed broadband subscribers (World Bank 2010), mobile phones are the primary means of communication for many, and particularly for young, politically engaged Ghanaians, social media is a crucial part of that. In the run up to the elections, and on the day itself, trained journalists and representatives from civil society will report back to Ghana Votes from across the country on everything from the length of queues at polling stations to alleged incidents of hate speech. Members of the public can also text in for free (or send in audio or video), and a team of volunteers will go through all the reports, assessing their veracity, comparing their reports with those from journalists and the security services, and plotting the incidents across a map of Ghana.

Millions of Ghanaians will be able to track online in real time exactly what is happening across the country. If there are allegations of vote rigging or ballot box stuffing, Ghana Votes will mean people are aware of them, and can press for action. As well as being used to track any possible problems with the election in Ghana, the information provided can also be used by journalists in writing stories, by civil society for advocacy, and after the election academics and researchers will access it.

Ghana Votes is not a political project, but by giving people information to make decisions for themselves, it underlines the credibility and transparency of the election process for Ghanaians. Ultimately, the power of technology like Ghana Votes is that it democratizes information. Citizens can be involved in monitoring elections themselves, and at a glance can find out exactly what is happening where. Perception is crucial - the moment a democratic election is not perceived to be fair is the moment it fails, and so the transparency that platforms like Ushahidi can provide is crucial.

Next month DFID is co-hosting an exciting conference, Open Up! - together with the Omidyar Foundation and Wired Magazine - where entrepreneurs, government and civil society will come together to galvanise action in the fast-growing field of open government. It will show how web and mobile technologies can drive more engagement of citizens in government and showcase entrepreneurs' innovations and experiences from around the world.

Ghana Decides is another online project supported by DFID through STAR Ghana which uses social media as a tool for promoting democracy and accountability. It launched a social media campaign called "#Iregistered" earlier this year encouraging Ghanaians to take part in the biometric voter registration exercise and asking them to report back on their experiences. Its website hosts a series of election related blogs and it will launch a further campaign encouraging people to vote on election day itself.

Social media and technology are not, of course, an unmitigated source for good in promoting democracy and open societies. As much as media reports point towards anecdotal evidence from the Arab spring of the democraticising power of Facebook and Twitter, at the same time terrorist groups like Al Shabab and Boko Haram were using them to recruit new members – as well as to empower and inform, these channels can be used to radicalise, exclude and enrage.

Whilst social media might be able to direct public attention towards crucial political events one minute, it can rapidly change direction the next. For example, although #Egypt might have edged out #JustinBeiber,  blog and newspaper coverage of the Iranian 'Green Revolution' dropped dramatically after the death of Michael Jackson. Likewise, whilst social media campaigns like Kony 2012 can succeed in drawing millions of people's attentions towards issues, they can risk manipulating the facts, simplifying complex issues, and their 'awareness raising' can fail to actually move people from talk to action.

There are of course, therefore, limits to how far projects like Ghana Votes and Ghana Decides can reach. Only something like 10-15% of Ghanaians use the internet, of the 18 phone subscriptions (World Bank 2010) only around a third are actually used for text messaging anyway (Afrobarometer Ghana 2012). The main way most Ghanaians gain information is still by radio, so a platform like Ghana Votes which is online, and in English rather than a local language, is not going to be accessible to large numbers of the population. However, the project is looking to address some of these issues by instituting a telephone number people can call for free to report incidents, for example, and providing this in a number of different local languages.

Ultimately, however, projects like Ghana Votes aren't seeking to replace traditional forms of political engagement or media, but rather both to amplify and augment them, to channel messages, and have a bridging function in bringing information to wider audiences. If openness, transparency and access to information are important to democracy, then social media platforms like Ushahidi must be a good thing. Social media cannot create democracy, or cause protests, but it can spread information.

The application of platforms like Ushahidi is not of course limited to elections. In Ghana the team behind Ghana Votes is also thinking about a project after the elections, using social media at a local level to allow citizens to track district level assemblies' delivery on their plans, for example. The kind of accountability this provides could help fill a real gap.

Afrobarometer is a survey that tracks citizens' opinions on democracy and governance in a range of African countries (it is partly funded by DFID - look out for a post on this in the future). The latest results from Ghana show the real demand for the kind of information and mobilisation that projects like Ghana Votes can provide. The survey shows, for example, that only 38% of Ghanaians have joined with other citizens to raise an issue in the past year. However, another 37% would have done so, but did not have the chance. Tools like Ghana Votes can give people this chance by providing them with the information they need to hold authorities accountable.

It wasn't Facebook or Twitter that caused the Arab Spring, and they won't change the course of the elections in Ghana, but they can help give people the information and the means to come together and hold their governments to account - that really is the power of we.

Ghana Elections 2012 : Jangbeeshi Mobile App

Jangbeeshi Mobile App

Description

Jangbeeshi is a mobile app for Ghanaian citizens to crowdsource Election data from the polling stations during the 2012 Elections.

This app was developed for African Election Project.

• Jangbeeshi app makes crowdsourcing of election data and monitoring as easy as a-b-c.
• Download the appropriate version for your phones. Symbian,Java, Blackberry, Android will be supported soon.
• Install the Jangbeeshi on your phone.
• Run the app. The first time it will ask for you to setup your profile.
• On successful completion of profile, the app's full menu would be available
• To create an election report, click on the REPORT menu.
• To report any suspicious activity or an election anomaly, click on the EMERGENCY menu and click on the appropriate button of the relevant agency you wish to contact
• To share and inform your friends and network of the Jangbeeshiapp, click on the SHARE menu to share via SMS, Facebook, Twitter or Email.
• For more information on the features of the app, click on theHELP menu.

Screenshots

Requirements

Compatible with Java Me (J2ME), Symbian, BlackBerry, Android devices.

Info

Updated: September 23, 2012
Current Version: beta
Size: 820kb
Languages: English

Africa Takes Off

Pity sub-Saharan Africa -- but maybe for not much longer. In the first decade of the new millennium, six of the world's ten fastest-growing economies (Angola, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique, and Rwanda) were from this region. And in eight of the past ten years, it has grown faster than Asia. To be sure, some of the region's growth stars owe their success in part to the global boom in commodity prices, most notably in oil. But Ethiopia managed to grow by 7.5 percent last year without producing a drop of petroleum. (Ethiopia's brightest newest export: cut flowers.) Note, too, that average incomes in sub-Saharan Africa are still very low; for example, the per capita income in Chad is below $1,800 measured in terms of purchasing power, less than a tenth that of Poland or the Czech Republic. It will thus take decades of growth to bring living standards to acceptable levels. But according to the IMF, the region is on track to grow by six percent this year, about the same as Asia. And there are convincing reasons to believe that a healthy pace can be maintained for the foreseeable future. Indeed, in the World Bank's view, Africa "could be on the brink of an economic take-off, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years ago." That should be raising doubts about the appropriateness of international assistance policies based on the presumption that Africa still lacks the capacity to break out of its dispiriting cycle of poverty, dysfunctional governance and tribal violence. More on that later. Ready to be surprised? Trade between Africa and the rest of the world tripled in the last decade. And by no coincidence, Africa has attracted more private foreign investment than official aid since 2005. Consider, too, that Africa's share of global foreign direct investment -- the most prized sort, since it brings along technology and management skills -- rose from less than one percent in 2000 to 4.5 percent in 2010. But perhaps the most visible evidence of widening prosperity is the incredibly rapid penetration of mobile communications. Take Ghana, which, by the World Bank's reckoning, graduated to middle-income status last year. In the late 1990s, the country has a mere 50,000 working phone lines in a country of nearly 20 million. Now, three-quarters of the population has access to cell phones with both voice and instant-message capability. In fact, the amount of money directed towards phone use has forced government bean counters to reconsider their (sometimes very rough) estimates of the region's income. In Ghana's case, the government recently revised upwards its estimate of private GDP by an astonishing two-thirds. This telecom revolution is generating vast, unanticipated benefits. For example, farmers with phones now have access to timely market information, which makes it possible for them to bargain more effectively with middlemen. And "mobile money" -- credits transferred securely from one phone to another by instant message -- makes banking possible where bricks-and-mortar banks hardly have a presence. No true "innovation cluster" yet exists in Africa. But the nexus of mobile telecom networks and financial services has spawned a collection of tech-oriented businesses in Nairobi, with Safaricom, Kenya's largest mobile supplier, at its hub. (The image above shows Nairobi by night.) The not-fully-realized value of wireless technology is encouraging entrepreneurs to think big. Very big: the Indian telecom Bharti Airtel paid $10.7 billion in 2010 for the African mobile-phone networks of a Kuwaiti-based Zain Telecom. Zambia, which also made the cut to lower-middle-income status last year, illustrates much of what's good that's happening to sub-Saharan Africa. The economy has been averaging five percent-plus growth over the past seven years. That's due in part to the cyclical boom in copper prices, Zambia's chief export. But Zambia's agricultural sector is doing very well, too. The production of corn, a staple, leaped by 50 percent in 2010. The record harvest, by the way, illustrates the importance of good governance; Accra's timely distribution of subsidized fertilizer to small farmers made a big difference in yields. The Zambian experience has been matched in neighboring Malawi, long a country plagued by food shortages and famine. Several years ago, the government launched a program (against the advice of international aid agencies) to both subsidize fertilizer and to support corn prices through purchases. Malawian farmers are now growing enough corn to satisfy domestic demand and have some left for export to its poster neighbor of bad governance, Zimbabwe. There are good reasons to believe that this agricultural boom will endure beyond the general commodities boom driven by Chinese and Indian demand. First, Africa possesses 60 percent of the world's uncultivated arable land. So while the region is still a net importer of food, there's no hard economic barrier to considerable expansion of production. Second, improved communications and transportation is making it practical to expand intra-regional food trade. Indeed, agricultural economist Steven Haggblade at the Michigan State University argues that the key to food security in Africa is increased investment rural infrastructure. Another reason for optimism about the sustainability of growth is the reduced likelihood of war. Scott Straus of the University of Wisconsin estimates that "African civil wars in the late 2000s were about half as common compared to the mid-1990s." What's more, "contemporary wars are typically small-scale... and involve factionalized insurgents who typically cannot hold significant territory or capture state capitals." The reasons for the decline in organized violence are not altogether clear. But there seems little doubt that economic growth makes war less likely, and less war makes growth more likely. The improved economic picture across sub-Saharan Africa has yet to translate into innovative approaches to the region by the international community. The U.S., Europe and Japan, the leading suppliers of technical assistance, grants and loans to Africa, still largely build policies on the premise that the region is mired in poverty and that the prevention of the worst forms of human degradation -- death by untreated disease, starvation, lack of clean water and physical security -- is a much higher priority than the more complex issues of building institutions that support macroeconomic stability, public infrastructure and efficient market incentives. One reason is the persistent belief that African growth isn't sustainable because it is largely dependent on steep rises in export prices for everything from cotton and cocoa to oil and copper. Certainly the boom has mattered. But as I discuss above, much points to the conclusion that growth is not transient this time around. Population expansion also casts a cloud over Africa. So when computed on a per capita basis, GDP growth remain substantial -- but not as substantial as one would like. Here, too, though, the big story is positive: Fertility rates are falling almost everywhere in Africa. There are subtler forces at work here, though, which retard the evolution of thinking about aid. Many governmental and non-governmental aid organizations have traditional commitments to combating famine and other extreme forms of suffering are institutionally reluctant to shift focus. Cynics would argue that the change would make fund-raising (both private and public) more difficult -- the slow accretion of productive capacity just isn't very media-genic. I suspect it is more closely tied to the need to shift from tried-and-true strategies of delivering charity to the far more difficult task of encouraging institution-building and managing the ambiguities of interest-group conflict. This glass is three-quarters full. Sub-Saharan Africa really does seem to be following other regions in building solid economies on the rock of institutional stability, free markets and more open trade, especially between African countries. Yes, ordinary Africans would benefit if international donors to acknowledged the new realities -- and there is a lot more that could be done by outsiders to accelerate positive changes. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/06/11/africa_takes_off_by_g_paschal_zachary?page=full

How to rig an election

Weighing the votes
A brief guide to electoral fraud for the busy despot
Mar 3rd 2012 | from the print edition

THE only poll that counts, supposedly, is election day. But for the
sophisticated vote-rigger that is terrible advice. Election day is too
late. If you go around beating up your opponents' voters, stuffing
ballot boxes and making up results, someone somewhere is bound to
complain. All those foreign busybodies will take you to task. It enrages the crowd and it dents your reputation.
It is also unnecessary. If you set about rigging the vote well in advance (see article), you can have an election that looks all right on the outside but
guarantees the result you want. And nobody will be able to object. The
secret is to obey the rules—having first written them yourself.
In this section
 
 
It all starts with television, where most voters (especially the
poorer and less-educated) get most of their news. Don't clamp down
completely—it makes you look weak. Tolerate small, ill-funded opposition outlets (not least so that you have an idea yourself of what is going
on). But make sure that you or your allies control all the main
television channels. Television news should trumpet your successes,
portraying you as statesmanlike, and perhaps also enjoying manly sports
and cuddly charity work.
This makes you the dominant brand in voters' minds. Your propaganda
machine should also highlight the opposition's foreign links, making
them look disloyal and alien. It should play up splits and divisions and any personal foibles (your own vices, meanwhile, must remain state
secrets).
This makes the next stages easier. Gerrymandering is an excellent
tactic. In a parliamentary election, corral your opponents' votes into
places where they pile up uselessly, while making sure that yours are
spread across plenty of marginal constituencies. If in doubt, look at
how it is done in America. Then sort out the electoral registers: you
need tough registration requirements for the voters who dislike you. You can count on votes from prisoners, army conscripts and others, so make
sure they are registered en masse.
The laws governing political parties are in your hands too: make them burdensome. That will sap the opposition's energies—and if they make a
single slip-up, you can always have their candidates struck from the
ballot. Your own party will control a mighty bureaucratic machine and
will meet the requirements easily. A sophisticated twist on this is to
create your own tame opposition parties, in several flavours. They will
distract attention from your real rivals.
You will have to allow some foreigners into your country on polling
day. So make it easy for the right ones (your ideological soul mates and those from other autocratic countries). Nosy nit-pickers from the West
can come too, but only at the last moment, so they have little time to
get organised. Discredit local election-monitoring outfits as
foreign-funded and partisan. Trumpet your fans' verdict at home: it will offset the complaints from those foreigners who, your television
channel can argue, are secretly bent on doing your country down.
Stuff and nonsense
Do not waste much time campaigning. Anything beyond the odd
triumphant rally makes you seem like a mere politician. Instead say you
are too busy minding the affairs of state—and make sure you are shown on television doing so.
On polling day hand out free food and booze in poor areas. In places
that will not vote for you, have the polling stations open late and
close early. If necessary, they can run out of ballot papers. Long
queues are a deterrent to busy people.
As insurance, you need to be able to fiddle the results. A
computerised system which is apparently secure but actually accessible
is ideal. If ballot-boxes are used, make sure they can be stored
overnight in a discreet location where, if all else fails, you can add
and subtract votes as necessary. If you get caught, say provocateurs are trying to discredit you.
None of this helps you run the country when you win. But who said politics was easy?

http://www.economist.com/node/21548946

How to rig an election

Weighing the votes
A brief guide to electoral fraud for the busy despot
Mar 3rd 2012 | from the print edition

THE only poll that counts, supposedly, is election day. But for the
sophisticated vote-rigger that is terrible advice. Election day is too
late. If you go around beating up your opponents' voters, stuffing
ballot boxes and making up results, someone somewhere is bound to
complain. All those foreign busybodies will take you to task. It enrages the crowd and it dents your reputation.
It is also unnecessary. If you set about rigging the vote well in advance (see article), you can have an election that looks all right on the outside but
guarantees the result you want. And nobody will be able to object. The
secret is to obey the rules—having first written them yourself.
In this section
 
 
It all starts with television, where most voters (especially the
poorer and less-educated) get most of their news. Don't clamp down
completely—it makes you look weak. Tolerate small, ill-funded opposition outlets (not least so that you have an idea yourself of what is going
on). But make sure that you or your allies control all the main
television channels. Television news should trumpet your successes,
portraying you as statesmanlike, and perhaps also enjoying manly sports
and cuddly charity work.
This makes you the dominant brand in voters' minds. Your propaganda
machine should also highlight the opposition's foreign links, making
them look disloyal and alien. It should play up splits and divisions and any personal foibles (your own vices, meanwhile, must remain state
secrets).
This makes the next stages easier. Gerrymandering is an excellent
tactic. In a parliamentary election, corral your opponents' votes into
places where they pile up uselessly, while making sure that yours are
spread across plenty of marginal constituencies. If in doubt, look at
how it is done in America. Then sort out the electoral registers: you
need tough registration requirements for the voters who dislike you. You can count on votes from prisoners, army conscripts and others, so make
sure they are registered en masse.
The laws governing political parties are in your hands too: make them burdensome. That will sap the opposition's energies—and if they make a
single slip-up, you can always have their candidates struck from the
ballot. Your own party will control a mighty bureaucratic machine and
will meet the requirements easily. A sophisticated twist on this is to
create your own tame opposition parties, in several flavours. They will
distract attention from your real rivals.
You will have to allow some foreigners into your country on polling
day. So make it easy for the right ones (your ideological soul mates and those from other autocratic countries). Nosy nit-pickers from the West
can come too, but only at the last moment, so they have little time to
get organised. Discredit local election-monitoring outfits as
foreign-funded and partisan. Trumpet your fans' verdict at home: it will offset the complaints from those foreigners who, your television
channel can argue, are secretly bent on doing your country down.
Stuff and nonsense
Do not waste much time campaigning. Anything beyond the odd
triumphant rally makes you seem like a mere politician. Instead say you
are too busy minding the affairs of state—and make sure you are shown on television doing so.
On polling day hand out free food and booze in poor areas. In places
that will not vote for you, have the polling stations open late and
close early. If necessary, they can run out of ballot papers. Long
queues are a deterrent to busy people.
As insurance, you need to be able to fiddle the results. A
computerised system which is apparently secure but actually accessible
is ideal. If ballot-boxes are used, make sure they can be stored
overnight in a discreet location where, if all else fails, you can add
and subtract votes as necessary. If you get caught, say provocateurs are trying to discredit you.
None of this helps you run the country when you win. But who said politics was easy?

http://www.economist.com/node/21548946