How to rig an election

Weighing the votes
A brief guide to electoral fraud for the busy despot
Mar 3rd 2012 | from the print edition

THE only poll that counts, supposedly, is election day. But for the
sophisticated vote-rigger that is terrible advice. Election day is too
late. If you go around beating up your opponents' voters, stuffing
ballot boxes and making up results, someone somewhere is bound to
complain. All those foreign busybodies will take you to task. It enrages the crowd and it dents your reputation.
It is also unnecessary. If you set about rigging the vote well in advance (see article), you can have an election that looks all right on the outside but
guarantees the result you want. And nobody will be able to object. The
secret is to obey the rules—having first written them yourself.
In this section
 
 
It all starts with television, where most voters (especially the
poorer and less-educated) get most of their news. Don't clamp down
completely—it makes you look weak. Tolerate small, ill-funded opposition outlets (not least so that you have an idea yourself of what is going
on). But make sure that you or your allies control all the main
television channels. Television news should trumpet your successes,
portraying you as statesmanlike, and perhaps also enjoying manly sports
and cuddly charity work.
This makes you the dominant brand in voters' minds. Your propaganda
machine should also highlight the opposition's foreign links, making
them look disloyal and alien. It should play up splits and divisions and any personal foibles (your own vices, meanwhile, must remain state
secrets).
This makes the next stages easier. Gerrymandering is an excellent
tactic. In a parliamentary election, corral your opponents' votes into
places where they pile up uselessly, while making sure that yours are
spread across plenty of marginal constituencies. If in doubt, look at
how it is done in America. Then sort out the electoral registers: you
need tough registration requirements for the voters who dislike you. You can count on votes from prisoners, army conscripts and others, so make
sure they are registered en masse.
The laws governing political parties are in your hands too: make them burdensome. That will sap the opposition's energies—and if they make a
single slip-up, you can always have their candidates struck from the
ballot. Your own party will control a mighty bureaucratic machine and
will meet the requirements easily. A sophisticated twist on this is to
create your own tame opposition parties, in several flavours. They will
distract attention from your real rivals.
You will have to allow some foreigners into your country on polling
day. So make it easy for the right ones (your ideological soul mates and those from other autocratic countries). Nosy nit-pickers from the West
can come too, but only at the last moment, so they have little time to
get organised. Discredit local election-monitoring outfits as
foreign-funded and partisan. Trumpet your fans' verdict at home: it will offset the complaints from those foreigners who, your television
channel can argue, are secretly bent on doing your country down.
Stuff and nonsense
Do not waste much time campaigning. Anything beyond the odd
triumphant rally makes you seem like a mere politician. Instead say you
are too busy minding the affairs of state—and make sure you are shown on television doing so.
On polling day hand out free food and booze in poor areas. In places
that will not vote for you, have the polling stations open late and
close early. If necessary, they can run out of ballot papers. Long
queues are a deterrent to busy people.
As insurance, you need to be able to fiddle the results. A
computerised system which is apparently secure but actually accessible
is ideal. If ballot-boxes are used, make sure they can be stored
overnight in a discreet location where, if all else fails, you can add
and subtract votes as necessary. If you get caught, say provocateurs are trying to discredit you.
None of this helps you run the country when you win. But who said politics was easy?

http://www.economist.com/node/21548946

How to rig an election

Weighing the votes
A brief guide to electoral fraud for the busy despot
Mar 3rd 2012 | from the print edition

THE only poll that counts, supposedly, is election day. But for the
sophisticated vote-rigger that is terrible advice. Election day is too
late. If you go around beating up your opponents' voters, stuffing
ballot boxes and making up results, someone somewhere is bound to
complain. All those foreign busybodies will take you to task. It enrages the crowd and it dents your reputation.
It is also unnecessary. If you set about rigging the vote well in advance (see article), you can have an election that looks all right on the outside but
guarantees the result you want. And nobody will be able to object. The
secret is to obey the rules—having first written them yourself.
In this section
 
 
It all starts with television, where most voters (especially the
poorer and less-educated) get most of their news. Don't clamp down
completely—it makes you look weak. Tolerate small, ill-funded opposition outlets (not least so that you have an idea yourself of what is going
on). But make sure that you or your allies control all the main
television channels. Television news should trumpet your successes,
portraying you as statesmanlike, and perhaps also enjoying manly sports
and cuddly charity work.
This makes you the dominant brand in voters' minds. Your propaganda
machine should also highlight the opposition's foreign links, making
them look disloyal and alien. It should play up splits and divisions and any personal foibles (your own vices, meanwhile, must remain state
secrets).
This makes the next stages easier. Gerrymandering is an excellent
tactic. In a parliamentary election, corral your opponents' votes into
places where they pile up uselessly, while making sure that yours are
spread across plenty of marginal constituencies. If in doubt, look at
how it is done in America. Then sort out the electoral registers: you
need tough registration requirements for the voters who dislike you. You can count on votes from prisoners, army conscripts and others, so make
sure they are registered en masse.
The laws governing political parties are in your hands too: make them burdensome. That will sap the opposition's energies—and if they make a
single slip-up, you can always have their candidates struck from the
ballot. Your own party will control a mighty bureaucratic machine and
will meet the requirements easily. A sophisticated twist on this is to
create your own tame opposition parties, in several flavours. They will
distract attention from your real rivals.
You will have to allow some foreigners into your country on polling
day. So make it easy for the right ones (your ideological soul mates and those from other autocratic countries). Nosy nit-pickers from the West
can come too, but only at the last moment, so they have little time to
get organised. Discredit local election-monitoring outfits as
foreign-funded and partisan. Trumpet your fans' verdict at home: it will offset the complaints from those foreigners who, your television
channel can argue, are secretly bent on doing your country down.
Stuff and nonsense
Do not waste much time campaigning. Anything beyond the odd
triumphant rally makes you seem like a mere politician. Instead say you
are too busy minding the affairs of state—and make sure you are shown on television doing so.
On polling day hand out free food and booze in poor areas. In places
that will not vote for you, have the polling stations open late and
close early. If necessary, they can run out of ballot papers. Long
queues are a deterrent to busy people.
As insurance, you need to be able to fiddle the results. A
computerised system which is apparently secure but actually accessible
is ideal. If ballot-boxes are used, make sure they can be stored
overnight in a discreet location where, if all else fails, you can add
and subtract votes as necessary. If you get caught, say provocateurs are trying to discredit you.
None of this helps you run the country when you win. But who said politics was easy?

http://www.economist.com/node/21548946

Happy Holidays

--
International Institute for ICT Journalism
www.penplusbytes.org

Carter Center: DRC Presidential Election Results Lack Credibility

The Carter Center finds the provisional presidential election results announced by the Independent National Election Commission (CENI) on Dec. 9 in the Democratic Republic of the Congo to lack credibility. CENI results point to the re-election of incumbent President Joseph Kabila with 49 percent of the vote followed by Etienne Tshisekedi with 32 percent and Vital Kamerhe with 7.7 percent. Voter turnout was 58 percent. Carter Center observers reported that the quality and integrity of the vote tabulation process has varied across the country, ranging from the proper application of procedures to serious irregularities, including the loss of nearly 2,000 polling station results in Kinshasa. Based on the detailed results released by CENI, it is also evident that multiple locations, notably several Katanga province constituencies, reported impossibly high rates of 99 to 100 percent voter turnout with all, or nearly all, votes going to incumbent President Joseph Kabila. These and other observations point to mismanagement of the results process and compromise the integrity of the presidential election. Candidates and parties have a limited time to submit any complaints to the Supreme Court, and tabulation for the legislative elections is ongoing. The problems observed in the tabulation and announced results are compounded by inadequate access for observers at multiple compilation centers around the country and no official access to the national results center in Kinshasa. The Carter Center is therefore unable to provide independent verification of the accuracy of the overall results or the degree to which they reflect the will of the Congolese people. Challenges in the results process were further evident in the CENI delays in announcing the results first for two days after the original date of Dec. 6 and then a second one-day delay to Dec. 9. Presidential candidates and the Congolese people are to be commended for waiting peacefully for the announcement of results, and the Center encourages all actors to maintain the same level of responsibility. It is also the responsibility of Congolese political actors and institutions to conduct their own examination of the election results and identify political solutions. The Carter Center is ready to assist in these processes if requested and appropriate. The Carter Center maintained 26 teams of international, impartial observers deployed in Kinshasa and the 10 provinces for the counting and tabulation. This assessment is based on direct observation during visits to 25 local results compilation centers (CLCRs) where tabulation of results was conducted and a preliminary examination of the published results. The Tabulation Process The electoral law[1] provides that immediately after counting, results forms are signed by all members of the polling station and witnesses, a copy of the results form is given to witnesses,[2] a copy of the results form is posted outside the polling station, and results forms and other election materials (ballot boxes, counted and unused ballots) are sent to the 169 CLCR. All materials are supposed to be collected and transported securely to the CLCR. Heads of polling centers were responsible for collecting and delivering all polling station material from their polling center including four sets of envelopes containing results by polling centers; one each for the CLCR, the national board of CENI, the provincial executive secretary of CENI (SEP), and the Supreme Court. Upon arrival at the CLCR, heads of polling centers present themselves to a reception desk to sign over all of their election materials. If all material was accounted for, the heads of polling centers were released of responsibility and sent home. Upon reception, the results envelope for the CLCR is sent to the collation desk, while the others are sent to archiving for later transmission to their final recipients. The results documents then pass through four desks where they are checked for consistency, the data entered on computers and compiled for transmission to the SEP and ultimately posted in front of the CLCR. At one stage, inconsistent documents may be reconstructed the basis of the counting form and polling station activity log by a team of three CENI members. After the compilation of results from all the constituencies under its responsibility, CLCRs transmit them to the SEP who consolidate for the province and send these to the CENI for publication of preliminary results.[3] General Findings Soon after election day, unofficial results started to circulate online and via SMS. Additional threatening messages were sent to members of domestic and international election observation missions. On Dec. 3, the minister of interior ordered the suspension of the emission and reception of SMS justified by the reportedly massive distribution of anonymous messages of intimidation, death threats, and calls for violence. This measure is an excessive attempt to deny freedom of expression; the authors of such messages could have been identified through regular channels of investigation. Other heavy handed responses were applied to media. The Superior Council of Audio Visual Communication suspended two broadcast networks without an official decision and one newspaper close to the opposition. In Mbuji Mayi, police closed broadcaster RLTV without cause. In comparison to the 2006 elections, the counting and tabulation procedures remained similar in their complexity which could have contributed to the uneven application across CLCRs and created opportunities for manipulation of results. As was the case five years ago, the logistical challenges of collecting, securing, and recording the results caused major difficulties for which CENI showed an insufficient level of preparation. CENI staff from voting centers and CLCRs were required to work extremely long hours for days at a time, often without adequate shelter, food, or water in trying and crowded physical conditions. In most of the cases observed, CLCRs were properly secured by police (military in some cases), however, in 15 percent of the cases their behavior could have influenced or intimidated CLCR personnel. In 15 percent of CLCRs observed, the reception and handling of sensitive election material did not follow the established procedures. Candidate witnesses were present in almost 90 percent of the cases but their physical position in the CLCR and access to information varied, disabling some from following all steps of compilation. Where problems with results paperwork necessitated a recount of ballot papers, witnesses were present in only a slim majority of cases observed. Archiving was reported to be disorganized in 25 percent of the cases and the results envelopes bound for the SEP, CENI, and the Supreme Court did not leave the CLCRs before the end of tabulation. Equipment to transmit electronic record of scanned individual polling station results forms to SEP and CENI was present in 73 percent of the cases but observers could not always confirm if they were functional or in consistent use. In many instances, heads of voting centers waited outside CLCRs for several hours and sometimes days with no organized provision of shelter, food, or water. Bulky items (mainly used and non used ballot papers and ballot boxes) were stockpiled outside of CLCRs, most of the time without care or protection from the weather. Even more importantly, bags of ballot papers and the envelopes containing results forms and other polling station paperwork were opened by heads of voting centers outside before they were officially received. After reception, the working conditions and storage provisions of CLCR varied. In some instances, bags of ballot papers were piled wherever floor space allowed, or spilled to the floor where they were stepped on by personnel because of lack of space. In more spacious centers, material was either stored in warehouses and piled in a more ordered manner or left outside, covered by tents and tarpaulins. Where a lack of organization in the storage of sensitive material prevailed, it was nearly impossible for CENI personnel to recover misplaced material. In multiple observed CLCR (e.g. Boma, Matadi, Bandundu, Mweka, and others) Carter Center observers found tabulation processes that they rated fair or good in 60 percent of cases. The overall assessment of other locations varied, with 40 percent rated poor based on an overall assessment of the application of procedures. Tabulated Results Lack Credibility The tabulation process in Kinshasa and Lubumbashi proved to be especially problematic. The lack of preparation evident in these two major cities resulted in serious irregularities and produced a tabulation process that lacks credibility. The generalized deficiencies described above prevailed in the extreme in both locations. Sensitive materials arrived by various means of transport, both official and private, were handled haphazardly, sometimes with bags and results envelopes opened, were stockpiled outside with insufficient or no protection from the elements (after a rain storm results forms were found hanging on sticks to dry), heads of polling centers were observed opening sealed envelopes with results forms and completing or altering paperwork in breach of procedure. Coupled with the general disorganization of these centers, a significant number of polling station results were lost. In Kinshasa, nearly 2,000 polling station results have been lost (representing as many as 350,000 voters) and hence will never be tallied. Another 1,000 polling station results have been lost elsewhere in the country (representing 500,000 voters). Also in Kinshasa, the uneven application of procedures led to heated debates on how to treat the unsigned results forms, often leading to partisan interpretation of procedures. In some instances, contested documents were said to have been transferred to the Supreme Court which at this stage remains impossible to confirm. CLCR staff sometimes appeared to be poorly trained with some staff reporting that colleagues had received no training. Furthermore, ineffective communication of procedural decisions made while the tabulation was ongoing resulted in important decisions being applied unequally, raising additional possibilities of manipulation of results, as neither CENI staff nor witnesses and observers could verify correct procedures. Physical and information access for observers and witnesses was inadequate and varied from day to day and among CENI staff at different CLCR stations resulting in a lack of transparency of the process. In some instances, senior CENI officials directly obstructed observation by Carter Center observers. For example, in Lubumbashi, Carter Center observers witnessed the president of a CLCR instructing his staff during their training not to give out any information to the observers. Similar instructions were given to CENI staff during tabulation in Kinshasa. According to the electoral law, each CLCR is to send its compiled result form to the SEP, who in turn sends compiled results for the province to CENI in Kinshasa for the announcement of a national result. It appears that only the compiled CLCR result forms have been sent to CENI, although the commission should receive its own envelope with an original copy of the polling station results. No comparison of physical results forms for verification of CLCR compilation at the national level could be observed and therefore assessed by the Center. Although formally requested from CENI, no official access was granted to Carter Center observer (or any others) to the national results center (CNT).[4] Thus, data transmission and management have been conducted in a nontransparent manner, eliminating a possible, and important, avenue to build confidence in the final election results, if observers and witnesses had been able to verify the handling of compiled results (CENI's organizing law contains a general transparency provision, the spirit of which should apply throughout the entire electoral process, even if specific arrangements are not specified in the electoral law).[5] The provisional results announced by CENI reveal multiple results that lack credibility. In Katanga province, two CLCR results are especially notable. The Mulemba Nkulu CLCR reports 99.46 percent voter turnout with 100 percent of votes, or 266,886 for Joseph Kabila, and fewer than 0.5 percent blank or null votes. All polling stations reported. Kabongo CLCR records similar high voter turnout with 227,885 votes for Kabila and only three votes for other candidates. A total of eight CLCR in Katanga report voter participation above 80 percent, far above the national average of 58 percent, and vote shares of 89 percent or higher for Kabila. Although the specific mechanism through which such vote totals may have been generated is unclear, numerous conditions cited in previous Carter Center reports may have been enabling factors, notably concerns about the credibility of the voter register and the potential multiple voting through abuse of the derogation votes and list of omitted voters, or through manipulation of vote totals at polling station or various stages of the tabulation. Thorough analysis with the records of domestic observers and candidate witnesses could yield more information. Review of locations with similar high percentage votes for Etienne Tshisekedi does not reveal the same coincidence of perfect collection of polling station results and extremely high voter turnout. Notably, although Tshisekedi scored very well in much of Kasai Occidental, 11 of 12 CLCR reported voter turnout below the national average, and in nine CLCR returns from Kasai Oriental where he received 90 percent of more of the vote, the rate of results collection and voter turnout were within reasonable variation of national rates. This assessment does not propose that the final order of candidates is necessarily different than announced by CENI, only that the results process is not credible. However, further analysis of preliminary results could reveal other important patterns and variations suggestive of a vote counting and tabulation that lacked uniform application to all Congolese voters. Additional analysis will be provided in future Carter Center reports. Background: The Carter Center international election observation mission has been in the DRC since Aug. 17, 2011, following an invitation from CENI. The mission was led by former President of Zambia Rupiah Bwezani Banda and Vice President of Carter Center Peace Programs Dr. John Stremlau, and is composed of 70 observers from 27 countries. The Center thanks CENI and all those Congolese who have welcomed Carter Center observers and given their time to meet with them. The Center's observation mission in the DRC is conducted in accordance with international standards for elections, and the observation mission was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and the Code of Conduct for International Observers that was adopted at the United Nations in 2005 and has been endorsed by 37 observation groups. #### "Waging Peace. Fighting Disease. Building Hope." A not-for-profit, nongovernmental organization, The Carter Center has helped to improve life for people in more than 70 countries by resolving conflicts; advancing democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity; preventing diseases; improving mental health care; and teaching farmers in developing nations to increase crop production. The Carter Center was founded in 1982 by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his wife, Rosalynn, in partnership with Emory University, to advance peace and health worldwide. http://www.cartercenter.org/news/pr/drc-121011.html

Gambia Elections 2011 : Commonwealth Preliminary Statement On Presidential Election

The Commonwealth was invited by the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) of The Gambia to observe the 24 November Presidential Election. In response to this invitation, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr Kamalesh Sharma constituted a five person Commonwealth Expert Team (CET) supported by a professional staff team from the Commonwealth Secretariat. I am honoured to have been invited to Chair the Team which has been present in the country since 18 November 2011, following a pre-election assessment mission led by the Commonwealth Deputy Secretary-General in October 2011. During four days of briefings, the Team met a number of stakeholders including the Chairman of the IEC, political party representatives, civil society groups, media, Commonwealth High Commissioners, the United Nations Development Programme, and international, regional and domestic observer groups. This statement is our preliminary assessment of the presidential elections which was held on 24 November 2011. It reflects largely our observations on the pre-election environment, the polling day itself and the post-election phase. Members of the Team were able to cover four of the five regions in the country on Election Day. We exchanged our findings with a number of other international and domestic observers, as well as members of the diplomatic community. These exchanges corroborated most of the impressions which we formed during the course of our observations. We will issue a Final Report containing our conclusions and recommendations on the entire process at a later stage and submit same to the Commonwealth Secretary-General, who will then transmit it to all the candidates and stakeholders. The Report will subsequently be released to all Commonwealth governments and to the public on the Commonwealth Secretariat website in the coming weeks. Key findings...The Pre-Election Environment The official campaign period was from 12 to 22 November. The Team arrived in Banjul on 18 November and had the opportunity to observe some campaign activities. The Team observed rallies of the ruling party, the Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), and that of a leading opposition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP). We commend political parties and the people of The Gambia for the peaceful manner in which the campaigns were generally held. We also commend the role of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for regulating the campaign under the Code on Election Campaign Ethics Order (made under section 92(1) of the Elections Act), and ensuring airtime on state media for all parties. A number of interlocutors indicated to the Team that this had raised the visibility of the opposition during the brief campaign period. We do, however, have concerns on the following significant developments, which we felt resulted in an uneven playing field: The short campaign period All opposition parties we met complained that the 11 day official campaign period was too short. We raised this issue with the IEC which explained that this matter had been discussed during meetings of the Inter-Party Committee (IPC), a dialogue mechanism for political parties. According to the IEC, it had assured political parties that they could engage with voters even before the official start of campaign, and that it had informed and obtained the cooperation of the Inspector General of Police for political parties who wished to commence campaigns before the official start of 12 November. We note that all political parties commended the IEC for its increased openness and accessibility during this election and appreciate the good faith in which this assurance was given. We are however of the view that an extended campaign period would have been preferable, and would have contributed to levelling the playing field in this election. Campaign Environment During our briefing sessions, some stakeholders complained that the President's 'Meet the People' tour which took place in July 2011 amounted to campaigning and gave him an undue advantage in the lead up to the presidential election. In this regard we wish to reiterate the conclusion of the report of the Commonwealth Observer Group after the 2006 presidential election which said: "the timing of the President's 'Dialogue with the People' tour was unhelpful, because it had the effect of interfering with the election campaign and providing an undue advantage to the incumbent." We urge that this concern be accorded the seriousness it deserves in order to create a best possible competitive political environment. We note, however, that almost all interlocutors, including some members of the opposition parties, commented on the following improvements during the campaign period: • A conciliatory tone in the rhetoric of the ruling party's candidate in advocating for peaceful elections and refraining from speaking ill of the opposition. We note that the opposition reciprocated this gesture. • The improving role of the IEC and the state media in ensuring that, "for the first time", provisions were made for all political parties to have equal airtime on state television, thereby ensuring the visibility of all parties during the brief campaign period. Advantage of incumbency and use of public resources While we acknowledge the advantages that normally accrue to all incumbents, we observed that the ruling party's use of the state machinery during the campaign period amounted to a serious abuse of incumbency. In this regard, the Team is able to confirm that it witnessed: • The uniformed military personnel participating in the APRC rally held in Banjul on Saturday 19 November 2011. Also, it saw three military trucks transporting youths wearing the party colour and emblem of the APRC in Churchill's Town on 23 November 2011. • The private newspaper, the Observer, carried reports of public institutions, such as the Ministry of Petroleum, donating campaign T-shirts to the APRC. • We received similar reports of public officials openly campaigning for the ruling party; in particular, we found the involvement of governors and their offices in APRC campaigns worrisome. We therefore urge all parties to adhere to the letter and spirit of the Code on Election Campaign Ethics Order, which was violated in this case. A stronger effort should be made in future elections to improve the enforcement of the Code of Conduct, by having clearer enforcement procedures. This would help the IEC to assert its independence and authority. We note that unequal access to funding was evident throughout the campaign period and that there was not a level playing field for the campaign with the advantage of incumbency exploited by the APRC. Indeed, the APRC spent far greater sums of money than that of the two other political rivals put together and, in the absence of campaign spending provisions, the level of competitiveness expected was compromised. We note also that the IEC failed to enforce the Code of Conduct which provides sanctions for such abuses. Ultimately, political will is required to implement these recommendations, which mirror those in the 2006 Commonwealth Observer Group Report. The ruling party's increased victory would suggest that it has nothing to lose in levelling the playing field and in curbing the abuse of incumbency. Polling day The Election Day was peaceful and managed in accordance with the Constitution and Electoral Act 2009. The Team was impressed by the high turnout of voters on Election Day, especially the large numbers or women and young people. The enthusiasm shown by Gambians for the election demonstrated their desire to contribute to the development of democracy in the country. Most polling stations opened on time on or just after 7.00 am. Polling stations were generally well-laid out, and polling officials and party agents present appeared to discharge their duties effectively in areas where Team members observed. We noticed the active role of young people and women as polling officials and party agents. Team members also noted the discreet security presence in a large number of polling stations. There were no overt acts of intimidation during voting. The Gambia has a unique voting system - the use of metallic ballot drums fitted with internal bells which ring once a ballot token, a marble, is dropped into the drum. Voters appeared familiar with this system, and polling officials were often seen listening for the sound of the bell to ascertain that the voter had indeed voted, and to identify any incidents of multiple voting. The secrecy of the vote was guaranteed as ballot drums were placed behind dark screens away from voters, polling staff, party agents and observers. Transparent and broken windows of school classrooms where ballot boxes had been placed were covered with improvised opaque materials. The new voter register appeared robust and we came across few instances where voters with valid voter cards could not find their names on the register. We commend the IEC on its success in this regard. Closing, counting and the results process At 4.00pm when polls closed, Team members witnessed polling officials observing the closing procedures, such as the sealing of the mouth of the ballot drums, with diligence. The ballot drums were then transported to the designated counting centres across the country with adequate security and within view of polling agents and observers. The rules of counting were closely followed; presiding officers publicly announced ballot tokens supplied, those remaining as well as any invalid votes. The seals of the ballot drums were broken in full view of those present, emptied into a sieve, and the marbles arranged into special counting trays holding 200 to 500 marbles at a time. Each candidate's result was publicly announced and the trays holding their tokens shown around before the result was certified. After this, the results were collated and declared by the Assistant Returning Officer before being transmitted to the regional IEC office, and then to the IEC headquarters. The Team was impressed by the general atmosphere of transparency and in some cases, collegiality, within which the closing and counting processes were conducted. The Team also commends the swift announcement of results by the IEC on 25 November, the day after the election. In any electoral process, there will always be room for improvement. We make the following technical recommendations in this spirit: • Although the number of polling stations has been increased to 1302 for the presidential election, some polling stations in urban centres are still large and overcrowded with long queues. We recommend a further increase in polling stations. • Voters' lists need to be more legible with bigger and clearer photos. • A more effective way of managing queues must be devised and efforts should be made to post list of voters in their respective polling stations before polling day. • The current arrangement of transporting ballots drums to counting centres is susceptible to avoidable hazards. It would be much better for the votes to be counted and recorded at polling stations and results displayed accordingly before tallying at collation centres in constituencies. Conclusion During the Team's briefing sessions with a range of stakeholders involved in the political process, some interlocutors highlighted the ruling APRC's achievements in economic development, particularly in the provision of infrastructure and social amenities. In spite of these achievements, the Government of The Gambia has been appropriately criticised for its human rights record including harassment and arbitrary arrests of government critics. Some of these violations have been brought to the attention of the Commonwealth Secretariat and other Commonwealth organisations, and are also well documented. During its briefing sessions, stakeholders further highlighted a number of them to the Team which will be addressed in our Final Report. A number of stakeholders informed us that they were fearful of criticising the government. Others who did not, appeared by their actions to be wary. The impact of these incidents is further exacerbated by the dominance of the executive which has eclipsed the other arms of government, in conflict with the Commonwealth Latimer House Principles on the separation of powers between the executive, legislature and judiciary. The Team also wishes to underscore that all other stakeholders in the democratic process of The Gambia must be allowed to play a more active role in deepening democracy as part of their fundamental human rights: the opposition parties must be given the space to develop into a credible and visible alternative and in this regard they must live up to the people's expectations; civil society and media organisations must be granted the space to empower citizens in a responsible and constructive manner; and the people of The Gambia must continue to engage actively in the wider democratic process building on their participation in this election in order to further strengthen governance processes in the country. The results of this election show that the Government of The Gambia has the mandate of its people to embark on the necessary democratic reforms which will guarantee sustainable economic development. The Commonwealth stands ready to assist in such reforms.